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Deutsche Bank (DB.US) launches Nomura (NMR.US) divestment: traditional major banks Web3 life and death game, who is charging toll fees?

Zhitongcaijing·11/16/2026 13:33:27
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According to Woofun AI, on November 11, 2026, traditional financial giants reached a tipping point in the strategic field of Web3: Deutsche Bank (DB.US) officially launched institutional cryptographic escrow services, covering Bitcoin, Ethereum, USDC, EURC, and AllUnity EURO stablecoin, and signed a memorandum of understanding with its asset manager DWS to explore tokenized products; on the same day, it was revealed that Nomura Holdings (NMR.US) is working with potential buyers such as Marex (MRX.US) Negotiate the sale of its crypto subsidiary Laser Digital.

This simultaneous progression and decline is not an accidental operational adjustment, but a violent collision of two very different Web3 business models in reality. One chose to charge a definitive rate by building infrastructure, while the other fell into a financial quagmire due to the risk of market fluctuations. The purpose of this article is to dispel market noise, break down the underlying logic of these institutions, clarify the structural reasons behind 'who makes money and who is angry', and reveal how revenue models determine the boundaries of life and death of traditional banks in the crypto world.

Among the winners, BlackRock (BLK.US) and J.P. Morgan Chase (JPM.US) showed how to achieve low-risk expansion through 'tokenizing existing assets'. In August 2026, BlackRock (BLK.US) launched digital shares for its six UCITS funds in the European ICS series. The total size of these funds is approximately US$311 billion. The point is that these funds are not directly converted into cryptocurrencies, but run on Ethereum through JPMorgan's (JPM.US) Kinexys platform, which tokenizes the entry.

This model did not reduce rate revenue due to going online; instead, it opened up new distribution and settlement channels through on-chain transfers. BlackRock (BLK.US)'s core action is to connect new interfaces to existing assets rather than create new high-risk assets. Meanwhile, JPMorgan's (JPM.US) Kinexys platform has reached $5 billion in daily transactions, and management aims to increase this figure to over $10 billion. In October 2026, JPMorgan (JPM.US) further expanded the JPM Coin Deposit Token (JPMD) to Ethereum. The success of this path does not depend on the bull market or whether the token is characterized as a security; its core logic is simply 'cheaper to settle than now'. By reducing settlement costs and improving liquidity, these two giants have stabilized their position as market infrastructure without taking directional risks.

Citibank (C.US), BNY (BNY.US), Goldman Sachs (GS.US), and Morgan Stanley (MS.US) have built another profit paradigm through rate competition and channel cultivation. Citi (C.US) expanded Citi Token Services to Japan and the United Arab Emirates in September 2026, and media reports suggest that a number of major banks are planning shared tokenized deposit networks. This type of business often does not directly charge explicit fees, and its benefits are reflected in increased deposit retention rates and customer stickiness. This is a defensive revenue strategy aimed at locking in the most expensive deposit resources.

BNY (BNY.US) and Goldman Sachs (GS.US) launched a tokenized monetary fund program for asset management clients as early as 2025. Participants include BlackRock (BLK.US), Fidelity, Goldman Sachs (GS.US) asset management, etc., which essentially sells a complete set of services that 'enable your funds to be held on-chain'. Morgan Stanley (MS.US) launched its own Bitcoin ETF in April 2026, lowering the rate to 0.14%, making it the lowest level in the market at the time, attracting about 100 million US dollars in capital in the first week. The profit model is clearly visible: through extremely low rates multiplied by huge channel traffic, stable income regardless of the direction of the currency price is achieved. What these institutions have in common is that their revenue sources all fall on fees and traffic, and no one relies on holding token stocks to profit.

Deutsche Bank (DB.US)'s strategy focuses on holding escrow positions and entering the market by seizing positions first and expanding products later. The institutional crypto escrow service launched by Deutsche Bank (DB.US) not only covers mainstream assets, but also operates under MiCA and German regulatory frameworks to ensure compliance. On the day of launch, Deutsche Bank (DB.US) signed an MOU with its asset management DWS to explore tokenized products.

This “no trading, no self-employment, first escrow” strategy epitomizes the ultimate pursuit of risk control by traditional banks. By providing escrow services, Deutsche Bank (DB.US) has established long-term cooperative relationships with customers without bearing the risk of market fluctuations, laying the foundation for subsequent expansion to higher value-added services such as tokenized issuance and settlement.

The advantage of this model is that revenue is linked to asset size rather than market fluctuations, thereby achieving income stability and predictability.

In contrast, Nomura Holdings (NMR.US) and its subsidiary Laser Digital, in the losing camp, are in trouble due to a mismatch between market-making risks and mechanisms. Laser Digital was founded in 2022. Its business covers institutional trading, market making, asset management and venture capital, and was profitable in 2024.

However, the turning point occurred during the flash crash on October 10, 2025, when altcoins fell 20% — 27% within minutes, and some varieties fell nearly 70% (AmberData data). As of the December quarter of 2025, Nomura (NMR.US) recorded a loss of approximately 10 billion yen in the EMEA region other than the four major divisions. The company attributed this to the digital asset business. The CFO said it had “tightened positions and risk exposure.” In terms of pre-tax losses, Nomura (NMR.US)'s European business lost 13.8 billion yen and 7.4 billion yen for the quarter ending March and September 2026, respectively.

Although Nomura (NMR.US) did not disclose the exact share of Laser in European performance, and Nomura (NMR.US) recorded record revenue during the same period, the market makers' institutional mismatch was highlighted: what market makers are most afraid of is not falling prices, but that inventories cannot be hedged by falling inventories. When Laser's inventory contains a large number of small to medium capitalization tokens with poor liquidity, the market repricing within a few minutes changes it from earning spreads to passive receipt. Listed banks' quarterly market capitalization pricing, VaR limits, and parent company capital reviews limit market makers' freedom to withstand fluctuations during retracements. This is a fundamental conflict at the institutional level, not a team ability issue.

The failure of ASX and the resistance faced by OKX/ICE (ICE.US) tokenized stocks further revealed the limitations of the 'sell risk' model. ASX announced in November 2022 that it was abandoning the blockchain to rebuild the CHESS clearing system. The project took about seven years and invested about 250 million Australian dollars. The reason for the failure was not that the technology was unworkable, but rather that extremely complex institutional engineering was reduced to a technical upgrade. As Reuters assessed, it burned not only money, but also market trust. In November 2026, OKX and ICE (ICE.US) tokenized US stock solutions were scheduled to go live under the SEC temporary innovation exemption framework, but they were collectively counteracted by issuers, and the opposition list surged from 22 to 67. According to IMF research, tokenized stocks are 1.5 times more volatile than traditional markets of the same standard.

Although the route has no disclosed losses, it is being repriced by the market. What is even more alarming is that B2C2 (under SBI), the benchmark for crypto-native market-making, is also being negotiated for sale. Even the “most capable people in this business” are looking for an exit, which shows that the claim that “traditional institutions lost to native teams” is untrue. The real problem is that the “risk of selling inventory” business model itself is being repriced as a whole. Ownership is not a variable; it is the business model that determines life and death.

Judging from the dismantling of the business model, the essential differences between the four revenue models determine the fate of the organization. Model 1 is management fee and custodian fee. The base is asset size. Representative institutions include BlackRock (BLK.US), BNY (BNY.US), Goldman Sachs (GS.US), and Deutsche Bank (DB.US) escrow. This model does not assume directional risk; the larger the asset size, the more stable the income. Model 2 is channel and settlement fee. The base is traffic. Representative agencies include Kinexys and Citi Token Services. This type of business can even be free, and its benefits are reflected in deposit retention and customer stickiness. Model 3 is price spread and inventory, and the base is a balance sheet, involving market making, proprietary, and OTC businesses.

This model is the best business when the market is good, but there is no lower limit downward, and the risk is extremely high. Model 4 is asset appreciation. The return comes from the cycle, involving the cryptocurrency treasury. The upward trend is strong in this model, but the downward performance is unsightly. The first two models earn “tolls that others must pay you,” while the latter two earn “not sure how much you are willing to bear.”

This fundamental difference explains why institutions such as BlackRock (BLK.US) are growing steadily, while institutions such as Nomura (NMR.US) are losing money.

Quantitative estimates further reveal the financial comparison between scale effects and inventory risk. Let's say the scale is $10 billion, charges 5-10 basis points, and annual revenue is approximately $5 million to $10 million. The value of this model lies in zero directional risk, high stickiness, and the ability to add charges such as collateral, settlement, and foreign exchange. In contrast, the revenue = AUM × management rate × share ratio model relies more on distribution. Only institutions with terminal channels can beat the rate war to 0.14%, and latecomers have little room to fight back. For the inventory model, assuming an inventory of $1 billion, with an average daily fluctuation of 3%, one standard deviation of the daily inventory profit and loss is about $30 million. Capital adequacy, hedging speed, and risk limits determine whether the market is a money printer or a money shredder, and these three are the most difficult elements of the banking system to adjust flexibly. Summary in one sentence: the first two benefits grow linearly with scale, and the risk at the end is limited; the third return and risk come from the same variable and cannot be separated.

Data compiled by Woofun AI shows that this difference in financial structure makes 'selling pipe' institutions significantly resilient to risk in the face of market fluctuations, while 'selling risk' institutions can easily be hit hard by a single black swan incident.

From a regional perspective, the 'pipeline' barriers created by Hong Kong's regulatory system provide another successful paradigm for traditional banks. Hong Kong's choice is very clear: make the system thicker than increase leverage. The VATP licensing system, the “Stablecoin Regulations” (Cap. 656) implemented on August 1, 2025, and tokenized bonds and settlement pilots led by the HKMA together form a combination of “official registr+regulated custodian+local currency settlement.” According to the classification method in this article, Hong Kong has almost built a “sales pipeline” into the main channel: escrow, settlement, issuance, and secondary transactions must go through a licensed entity, and the path of pure speculation has been reduced to a minimum. When BlackRock (BLK.US) connected the $311 billion monetary fund to the chain, JPMorgan (JPM.US) distributed deposit tokens to Ethereum, and DB.US (DB.US) made escrow an official product, the real challenge was to make these 'pipelines' willing to connect Asian nodes to this system rather than anywhere else. Hong Kong's regulatory framework has built a unique competitive advantage in the Web3 sector by providing certainty and compliance, attracting institutions seeking stable revenue to settle in.

In conclusion, the most profitable people in Web3 have never been the ones who know the most about tokens, but the people who charge the most tolls. The experience of the past five years can be condensed into two sentences: those who sell pipelines are using scale as a cost barrier; those who sell risk are turning fluctuations into lessons. The next watershed moment is whose trading desk is faster, and whose roster is thicker, more reliable in hosting, and cheaper to settle. The reported Nomura (NMR.US) sale this time was not a surrender, but probably a decent retreat; the launch of Deutsche Bank (DB.US) was not a declaration, but a quiet takeover. History doesn't rate volunteerism; it only prices business models. For traditional financial institutions, only by understanding their strengths and choosing an income model that matches their risk tolerance can they stay invincible in the Web3 wave.